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The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) initiated a military 
intervention in 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after years of indecisiveness regarding who was 
responsible for intervention and the American public’s opposition to U.S. involvement. The 
pattern of U.S. intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina was guided by the nature of U.S. 
domestic political attitudes. Prior to the breakout of conflict in 1992, the American public was 
not primarily concerned with the situation in the former Yugoslavia and particularly in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The administration of U.S. President George H.W. Bush was selectively 
engaged in the situation in Bosnia and preferred to defer from direct engagement in the initial 
months of the conflict. While under the leadership of President Clinton, the United States had a 
more engaged approach due to the CNN effect and the drastic shifts in public opinion leading up 
to the 1996 presidential election. The paper will analyze the motivation behind the U.S. 
intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We will assess the geostrategic and moral 
considerations of the United States relative to American public opinion during that time. In order 
to analyze the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we will continue to discuss the historical events 
and how public opinion shifted as a result of these events. I will conclude by discussing the 
public opinion trends and the political rationale for intervention that was ultimately driven by 
concerns over the upcoming presidential election. 
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Introduction 
The dissolution of Yugoslavia sparked a wave of humanitarian and military intervention 
in the region that served as a turning point in international relations. Throughout the mid-1990s, 
the conflicts in the Balkans shifted international and American public opinion which redefined 
America’s role in Europe. The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) initiated a military intervention in 1995, after years of indecisiveness regarding who 
was responsible for intervention and the American public’s opposition to U.S. involvement. 
Following the Holbrooke mission in the summer of 1995, U.S. diplomacy in the Balkans was 
structured on multidimensional stability and activism. The choice of the Clinton administration 
to intervene in Bosnia and Herzegovina posed many questions on the domestic front within U.S. 
media and domestic public opinion. Following the Vietnam War, many Americans questioned 
and criticized the United States’s involvement in a geographical region where intervention was 
not abundantly popular on the home front. However, the interest in the Western Balkans resulted 
from humanitarian and moral considerations and the desire of the United States to facilitate 
democratization within the region.  
The paper will illustrate the timeline of historical events leading up to U.S. involvement 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and discuss the explanations and motivations of the United States 
intervention. It will assess the level of public support regarding whose responsibility it was to 
take action to stabilize the region, and support for air strikes, the implementation of the no-fly 
zone, and the favorability of military action. Finally, it will address the shift in public perception 
of presidential handling of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and conclude how the polling 
data contributed to the actions of the United States government in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
Literature Review 
CNN Effect  
The phases of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War Western Balkans were spread 
over two presidential administrations and divided into three phases: (1) an initial reluctance to 
interfere in a primarily European problem, (2) an attempt at diplomacy and (3) armed military 
intervention (Klemenčič, 2013). Scholars have asserted that there are two main factors that 
fueled U.S. motivation for intervention in the 1990s included: (1) the CNN effect, and (2) the 
moral indignation of the presidential administration, as both of these factors impact public 
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support for foreign interventions. The media “strongly influences public perceptions of 
contemporary political issues and may raise the salience of some issues over others” (Carey, 
2001, 73). The CNN effect is the concept that violent or emotional imagery that is depicted on 
daily news in regard to international conflict sparks moral outrage. This outrage then translates to 
political pressure and a rise in political discourse whereby public support for humanitarian 
intervention rises (Western, 2002, 1).  
Television indirectly influences political agendas where foreign interventions are 
concerned. The amount of television coverage during the intervention in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (in addition to interventions in Kosovo and Haiti) were tremendous and constituted 
the number one foreign policy story in the U.S. media throughout the Clinton presidency (Carey, 
2001, 74). The moral indignation of the presidential administration related to the feelings of 
moral responsibility of the American administration to stop international human rights violations 
against the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. The constant depiction of news footage that streamed 
into the average American’s home helped to exaggerate the scheme of the events in Bosnia, and 
“contributed to a public consensus for action” (Carey, 2001, 74). Three years leading up to the 
intervention in Bosnia, television coverage highlighted the power behind depicting the atrocities 
occurring in Serb concentration camps. The use of media in this regard fueled American public 
opinion more fervently than the killings of Bosnian Muslims from 1991-93, “which hardly 
caught the attention of the U.S. public, in part because most of it had taken place in remote 
villages out of a camera’s eye” (Carey, 2001, 74). The spread of information and visual evidence 
of the atrocities that occurred affected public opinion in such a way that directly impacted the 
Clinton administration’s decision to intervene and to exhibit a strong foreign policy approach for 
moral and political purposes.  
 
The Presidency and Public Opinion 
During the end of the George H.W. Bush presidency, “in May 1992, 55% of those polled 
opposed U.S. air strikes against the Serbs, and 61% of women (the base of swing votes) opposed 
them” (Carey, 2001, 75). After this, public opinion on airstrikes declined, until the emergence of 
news regarding ethnic cleansing against Bosnian Muslims that occurred in the following month. 
By August 1992, 53% of registered voters favored U.S. participation in a UN-authorized 
intervention involving air strikes or ground troops” (Carey, 2001, 75). The then Presidential 
 4 
candidate, Clinton, harshly criticized President Bush’s policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 
choosing to stay out of the conflict, but public opinion on U.S. intervention during the first year 
of the Clinton presidency declined for several months.  
In 1994, President Clinton’s approval ratings dropped significantly, and the 
administration was concerned over the perception of incompetency in President Clinton’s 
policies in the Western Balkans. On the domestic front, the public was generally satisfied with 
his presidency, but “the constant images of killings, and U.S. inaction, contributed heavily to low 
public perceptions of his performance as president” (Carey, 2002, 75). President Clinton catered 
to the results of public opinion polls in the years leading up to his reelection campaign to assess 
the public’s view on how he was simultaneously handling multiple international crises. The 
motivation behind his actions during the war relates to public opinion and is reflected through 
polling approval rating data and their actions in foreign interventions. The variability of 
Clinton’s position on the use of militarized force in Bosnia were in alignment in the gaps in 
public opinion polls during this time “Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke argued 
that the situation in Bosnia had put President Clinton’s reelection at risk and that decisive action 
was needed to resolve the conflict (Carey, 2001, 75). President Clinton and his cabinet felt that 
the only way to solve the Bosnia crisis and improve the chance of reelection would be to take 
decisive action and “to send a signal that the United States was seriously committed to forcing a 
negotiated solution” (Carey, 2001, 75). The American public was primarily concerned with the 
intervention but cared about limiting U.S. casualties and successfully achieving the foreign 
policy objectives of the United States. This subsequently led to the NATO bombings that 
coerced peace negotiations among the Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats in 1995. Ultimately, 
the Dayton Peace agreement was viewed as one of President Clinton’s greatest achievements in 











What was the motivation behind U.S.-led intervention and engagement in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina? 
Hypothesis 
The rationale for conventional intervention in the 1990s were founded upon two 
explanations, the CNN Effect, and the morality behind intervention. Each of these explanations 
have an effect on public opinion which was one of the main drivers of action regarding 
international intervention in Bosnia. Therefore, if public opinion shifts in support of certain 
actions regarding the intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, then action by the Clinton 
administration during the timeline of the intervention acted in alignment to meet the shift in the 
public views.  
I will be assessing the considerations of military intervention of the United States relative 
to American public opinion during that time. I will be conducting a qualitative analysis in my 
comparison of why the United States decided to intervene and the relevant goals of the initiatives 
that were considered during U.S. action in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their eventual 
disengagement in the region. In order to analyze my case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I will 
continue to discuss the actions that were outlined in my literature review and analyze U.S. 
presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina relative to public opinion polling data. I will look at polling 
data from several American news outlets and polling agencies spanning from 1992 – 1996. I will 
be discussing public opinion data on whether the United States and the United Nations had a 
responsibility to intervene in the Former Yugoslavia and polling data on whether the U.S. had an 
obligation to do more to stop the war in Bosnia. Lastly, I will discuss polling data trends of 
support for U.S. military action (with and without European support), the use of a no-fly zone, 
and air strikes against Bosnian Serbs. The conflict in Bosnia emerged during the end of the Bush 
administration and continued into the second Clinton administration, therefore I will also analyze 
the polling data on approval of the U.S. President’s handling of the war in Bosnia.  
 
Relevance  
 The impact of the United States and NATO allies, on troubled regions of the world has 
been substantial in terms of military intervention and humanitarian peacekeeping missions. The 
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actions taken by the United States during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina left an 
impression on the development and stabilization of the region. The United States was heavily 
involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the mid-1990s, and the actions by the U.S. 
administration along with its European allies played a role given the views of the American 
public and visibility of the events that occurred. The violent events and genocide that occurred 
throughout the war played into the resolution of the conflict and the eventual U.S-coordinated 
peace agreement.  
Continually, the initial reluctance of the U.S. to intervene in Bosnia played a critical role 
of the engagement of multilateralism in the conflict within NATO. Multilateral action in Bosnia 
did not always go smoothly and was thought to harm the image of President Clinton in the eyes 
of Americans and as well as internationally. Overall, the multilateral approach was effective in 
stabilizing Bosnia and “the United States was able to link the alliance’s future credibility to 




Phase One: Reluctance to Intervene 
At the beginning of the Cold War, conflict arose between the Yugoslavian Communist 
Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The leader of Yugoslavia, Josip Tito, 
adopted a foreign policy initiative in which he had a non-aligned approach to both the USSR and 
the United States for the duration of the Cold War. Until the 1980s, the United States and other 
Western democracies supported Yugoslavia economically and politically to serve as an 
alternative example of an Eastern European state breaking away from Moscow’s influence 
(Boyadjeva, 2002). After the death of Josip Tito in 1980, economic, political and ethnic crisis 
overtook Yugoslavia and a sharp rise in nationalism eventually led to the state’s demise. In a 
report released by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1990, the agency predicted that 
Yugoslavia would cease to function within one year and would most likely dissolve within two 
years (Klemenčič, 2013, 1). Overall, Yugoslavia lost its role as a vital partner in the U.S. 
political strategy, a position which Belgrade held during the Cold War but actually lost in the 
early 1990s when the conflicts began.  
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In the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, American law-makers were wary of publically 
offering their support for any group involved in the crisis. “The national energy and financial 
resources that had been spent on the Gulf Wars in the early 1990s made the United States give up 
a decisive role in an intrinsically European problem of the EU member states” (Boyadjeva, 
2002). The European Union’s shortcomings in the Balkans raised concern for the development of 
a European foreign and security policy. The emergence of military conflict in the Yugoslavian 
federation was dealt with by western allies: The United States, France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom. This alliance initiated low risk actions such as economic sanctions and the 
implementation of an arms embargo by the western nations that were involved at that stage. In 
this initial stage, the United States had very little direct involvement in the Balkans. The main 
priority of the first Bush administration was to preserve of the integrity of Yugoslavia. The 
message given by the administration was that, “the Yugoslavian peoples should solve their 
internal problems themselves, but Washington preferred having a united Yugoslavia as a partner 
in the international arena” (Boyadjeva, 2002). The United States wanted a united Yugoslavia in 
order to have a stable partner. However, the eventual dissolution of Yugoslavia sent the 
relationship with the U.S. and the individual Yugoslav states into a state of uncertainty. The 
tensions in the region began with the declaration of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty and 
escalated further on March 1st, 1992, when Muslim Bosniaks and Croats voted for independence 
in a referendum, which was heavily boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs. 
The patterns of U.S. interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other UN 
peacekeeping missions were guided by the nature of U.S. domestic political attitudes. Prior to the 
breakout of conflict in 1992, Americans were not concerned with the situation in the former 
Yugoslavia and particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This in part was a result of lack of 
media attention at the breakout of the conflict and the lack of public awareness of the conflict. 
The administration of U.S. President George H.W. Bush became selectively engaged in Bosnia 
but preferred to abstain from direct engagement in the initial violent months of the conflict. The 
Bush administration heavily criticized the Serbian leadership in Belgrade for inciting violence in 
the region and sought to isolate the regime of Slobodan Milosevic through diplomatic action. 
The U.S. administration “nonetheless firmly believed and publicly emphasized that the conflict 
was the inevitable consequence of intractable and primordial hatreds unleashed with the collapse 
of the communist government's tight control” (Western, 2002). United States foreign policy 
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engagement during the early 1990s was to avoid intervening in a situation that would ultimately 
lead to a “Vietnam-style quagmire” in the Balkans. On the domestic front, public support was in 
line with the administration’s policies on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The public supported the 
limited policy initiatives in order to contain the conflict from spreading to areas of geostrategic 
interest to the United States--in particular Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Turkey, and 
Bulgaria (Western, 2002). The relationship between Belgrade and Washington and Moscow 
respectively, was significantly stifled during this time. After the fall of communism and violent 
ethnic conflicts in the Western Balkans, the media was expected to become active stakeholders 
in facilitating democracy by providing a forum for unbiased information to the general public 
(Andresen, 2017). The U.S. held this position with the rise in regional tensions in 1991, and only 
advocated for a solution through negotiations between the regions, without directly taking sides.  
 
Phase Two: An Attempt at Diplomacy 
The Siege of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, began in April of 1992, after the European 
Union recognized Bosnia’s independence, which led to Bosnian Serbs laying siege to the city. 
Despite the engagement of US representatives and diplomats at various levels and the 
Congressional hearings on the need for action in the Balkans in 1992-1993, the U.S. did not 
initiate a plan for direct involvement in the conflict. In the meantime, it proved equally difficult 
for the European Community to reach a consensus on the breakup of Yugoslavia. The press and 
media establishment during the conflicts highlighted the inconsistencies on the perspectives of 
France, Great Britain and Germany in regard to how to conflict should be handled. From the 
point of view of those that favored a stronger international action, the ineffective initiatives of 
the European Community highlighted an even greater need for U.S. and NATO involvement.  
 In 1992, the UN Security Council outlined resolutions that established a system of 
sanctions against Yugoslavia. The U.S. proposed an oil embargo and the freezing of all Yugoslav 
assets to the United Nations that year, in which Moscow supported, in addition to other UN 
resolutions regarding the conflicts. 
 In the spring of 1993, the Clinton administration adopted a policy in order to “wait and 
see” how the conflict would unfold before the U.S. would pursue direct engagement. After U.S. 
President Bill Clinton took office, the U.S. administration made a conscious effort to balance the 
U.S. as an international leader on the world stage and the U.S. engagement in peripheral conflicts 
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like the ones that were present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, and Haiti (Boyadjeva, 
2002). In March 1993, President Clinton declared that the U.S. would support the principles of 
multilateralism alongside its NATO allies in the on-going conflicts in the Balkans. This led to the  
first multilateral effort of the U.S., Russia, the UK, France and Germany in 1994. The 
United States publically advocated for a peaceful solution and worked closely with Russia 
because of the links the latter had with the Serbs in Yugoslavia and other historical 
considerations (Boyadjeva, 2002).  
Later that year, the administration implemented a new approach to contain the conflict in 
the Balkans known as the “lift and strike” strategy. It included the lifting of the arms embargo to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina thus giving the opportunity to the Bosnian government to defend itself. 
Nevertheless, public opinion and international opposition precluded the use of air strikes against 
the Bosnian Serbs as retaliation for their aggression. The new strategy went through strict 
deliberations and debate within the U.S. Congress and actively promoted U.S. diplomacy. 
However, this initiative was disapproved by some Western European allies. While supported by 
Germany, it was opposed by France and Great Britain, whose main concern was that the U.S-led 
action would spread violence to neighboring areas and the strategy pose risks to the safety of 
NATO troops. By contrast, the two European powers were in support of lifting the arms embargo 
that was debilitating for the Bosnian Muslims that were less readily armed.  
 Due to the active opposition of some key NATO allies, the lift and strike policy was 
halted. During this stage of the conflict, the goal of Washington was to facilitate a strategy of 
containment as an opportunity to end conflict in the territory outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The U.S. attempted to lower the level of media attention to the conflict on the domestic news 
cycle by sending a small group of troops along with UN forces at the Serbian and Macedonian 
border, to symbolize strength and show strong American presence in the region.  
The foreign intervention in the Western Balkans caused an increased interest in the role 
that American media can play in affecting U.S. involvement in peacemaking and peacebuilding. 
In February 1994, the first Markale attack on a market in Sarajevo occurred, in which 68 people 
were killed and 144 others were injured. This event led to renewed calls for multilateralism in 
the international approach to the Bosnian conflict. “After extensive debates NATO issued an 
ultimatum that reflected a compromise between the US and French position thus marking the 
return of France to a joint military operation, conducted by NATO” (Boyadjeva 2002). The 
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Washington Agreements and the establishment of the Muslim Croat Federation in March 1994 
further impacted the progression of the Bosnian Conflict. The United States government 
pressured the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to join forces through these agreements. The 
Bosnian government “immediately accused Serbian secessionist forces of responsibility and 
Western governments and news outlets embraced the story with little or no skepticism” 
(Carpenter, 2011). Following the NATO ultimatum, the United States negotiated in order to 
facilitate the eventual settlement of the conflict through the implementation of a model that 
would halt all military actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, deploy UN peacekeeping forces and 
force the withdrawal of all heavy weaponry from the area.  
American diplomats attempted to convince the Bosnian Muslims that they would not 
succeed in their military campaign even if they increased their armament and attempted to attract 
more NATO troops. This led to a clear division among NATO allies. France, Germany and 
Belgium declared their preparedness for immediate airstrikes, while Great Britain, Spain and 
Greece strongly opposed them. The United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was 
established in 1992 as an arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for 
the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslavian crisis. The role of UN troops was to 
ensure that areas designated as “UN Protected Areas” (UNPA) became and “remained 
demilitarized and that all persons residing in these areas were protected from fear of armed 
attack” (National Defense and the Canadian Armed Forces, 2017). The Commander General for 
UNPROFOR, Michael Rose, insisted on reaching a cease fire agreement without issuing 
ultimatums that would exacerbate tensions in the region. Meanwhile, German diplomats tried to 
push the Croats to give up their claims to certain territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
led Russia to take the initiative to convince the Bosnian Serbs to agree to the status quo.  
As a response to the Markale attacks, a new phase of engagement by the international 
community in the conflict occurred, with a heavier involvement of Washington and Moscow. 
The United States played a leading role as a mediator between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian 
Muslims in government “aimed at the establishment of a federation between the two 
communities and an eventual future economic confederation between Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” (Boyadjeva, 2002). In parallel, Russia asserted its role as the mediator in 
negotiations between Bosnian Serbs and other ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
NATO ultimatum and the subsequent diplomatic negotiations represented a turning point of the 
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conflict. The U.S. and Russia led the negotiations and became leading international actors in the 
peace process, which was previously meant to be handled by EU member states.  
The crisis that occurred in February 1994 led international institutions to avoid the option 
of military force as a means for solving the conflict. The multilateral actions led to the 
Washington Agreement, which established a Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and put an end to the Muslim/Croat conflict. “The agreements although incomplete 
undoubtedly added to the prestige of the United States and its right to mediate in the complicated 
Balkan affairs” (Boyadjeva, 2002). These actions led to the creation of a Contact Group made up 
of conflict mediators from Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States.  
The Contact Group served as a balance of power structure to attempt to resolve the 
conflict. “The talks about finding a solution to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina turned out 
to be more of an attempt to regulate the relations between the five powers themselves in the 
framework of the new international order rather than finding solutions to the complex 
relationships between the various ethnic and historical entities in the region” (Boyadjeva, 2002). 
The geostrategic interests of the United States and Western European countries were based upon 
the power position of the American hegemon and the United States’ determination for how 
intervention is framed and conducted. 
In the Spring of 1994, the Clinton administration was criticized for its policies in Bosnia 
among members of Congress. Prominent representatives considered the strategies in Bosnia as 
too collaborative with Russia and raised concerns on the inclusion of Russian troops within 
UNPROFOR. The White House defended its positions by reiterating that Russian involvement 
during this Bosnian crisis was an effective strategy and an indispensable collaborative measure 
after the market attacks in Sarajevo earlier that year, as it led to the NATO ultimatum and events 
that followed.  
 
Phase Three: Armed Military Intervention 
In April 1994, after the bombing against the Muslim enclave in Gorazhde, the 
international community began a more active approach to engagement in the Bosnian conflict. 
International actors had the upper hand engagement in the Balkans because they had the ability 
to threaten the use of air strikes. However, the use of these threats placed a rift between the 
countries that participated in the Contact Group. The threats put the interests of the United 
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Kingdom and France against the views of the United States on how to approach direct 
militarized engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Clinton administration refused to allow 
U.S. troops to be deployed to the area and attempted to secure diplomatic and military support 
for the reimplementation of the lift and strike policy, which would lift the arms embargo and 
then order air strikes. Subsequently, two American fighter bombers under NATO command 
bombed Serbian targets near Gorazhde, marking the first time that NATO warplane had been 
used to attack Serbian ground positions during the Bosnian conflict (Sudetic, 1994). The 
American media claimed that the U.S. and its NATO allies had taken all necessary measures to 
resume negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs, and that “force was the only existing argument that 
the Bosnian Serb soldiers understood” (Boyadjeva, 2002). Following the air strikes, U.S. 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher publicly expressed his optimism for the possibility of a 
ceasefire agreement.  
President Clinton announced to the public that the attack was in line with UN resolutions 
and demonstrated “the will of NATO and the will of the United Nations” as a function of 
UNPROFOR operations (Boyadjeva, 2002). President Clinton’s intention was to send a message 
to the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw from Gorazhde and restart the negotiation process. The 
airstrikes presented a threat to the newly achieved concurrence of action between the U.S. and 
Russia.  
After the situation in Gorazhde worsened, the US and NATO Secretary General Manfred 
Wörner called for additional airstrikes to prevent more attacks by the Bosnian Serbs. However, 
British diplomats categorically opposed the U.S. call for additional airstrikes citing that it was 
incompatible with UNPROFOR’s mandate. President Clinton had considerable freedom to act on 
the aggression of Bosnian Serbs by stating that they would not be allowed to continue their 
aggressions with impunity (Robbins and Rogers, 1999). The subsequent compromise was that 
NATO would begin immediate airstrikes if the Bosnian Serbs did not comply with the following 
criteria: (1) immediate halt of their air strikes, (2) withdrawal of troops within 3 kilometers from 
the center of Gorazhde, and the withdrawal of all heavy armory to an area 20 kilometers away 
from Gorazhde (Boyadjeva 2002). The Gorazhde crisis was a serious threat to joint actions of 
allies within NATO. “The United Kingdom and France warned that the continuing deployment 
of the lift and strike policy would lead to a withdrawal of their respected military units of ground 
forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Boyadjeva 2002). While the crisis in Gorazhde ended in 
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April, it brought up issues of disagreement among NATO allies and put a rift between Russia 
and the United States within the context of the United Nations. Through the work of the Contact 
Group, the players involved wanted to make gains in ending the hostility in Bosnia within four 
months. The breakthrough in multilateral action in Bosnia did not occur until the following year, 
and “for more than two years, the US involvement there passed under the motto that it was not in 
the interest of the United States to interfere militarily and what it needed was protection of the 
humanitarian missions and UN peacekeeping forces” (Boyadjeva, 2002. 15).  
 In July 1995, Serb forces laid siege to the enclave in Srebrenica and slayed upwards of 
7,000 Bosnian men and boys, expelling thousands more in one of the largest mass movements 
caused by ethnic cleansing. The Clinton administration previously held hesitations to act beyond 
the “lowest common multilateral” level which encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to react, 
culminating in the massacre (Recchia, 2015, 114). The inconsistency of the Clinton 
administration was progressively becoming a political liability after the Srebrenica massacre. 
“The events at Srebrenica in July 1995 provoked further condemnation of Clinton’s exceedingly 
timid approach in U.S. and international media” (Power, 2004, 430). After the massacre, U.S. 
diplomat Richard Holbrooke, and U.S Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright, 
initiated an effort to persuade officials in the Pentagon to push for “using military pressure to 
compel the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate a suitable peace settlement” (Recchia, 2015, 133). This 
led to significant disagreement among NATO allies on whether to initiate an active bombing 
campaign, until August 28, 1995 when a second attack occurred in a Sarajevo marketplace, 
which led France, Great Britain, Germany and the United States to call for NATO air strikes. 
The Clinton administration, which was in favor of intervention, began to see the air strike 
campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, as imminent: “President Clinton himself reportedly 
insisted, referring to the Bosnian Serbs, “we have to hit ‘em hard” (Recchia, 2015, 134). 
 On October 12, 1995, a formal ceasefire took effect in Bosnia. The ceasefire agreement 
was a part of a U.S. led effort to broker peace and stability in the region. In the hours leading up 
to the truce, the Serbs were continually moving to expel nearly 20,000 non-Serbs from the 
northern region of the country (Associated Press, 1995). The U.S. Defense Department preferred 
that the U.S. “hold its nose and accept most Serb territorial gains while at the same time seeking 
to persuade the Bosnian Muslims to sign a permanent cease-fire” (Recchia, 2015, 120). The U.S. 
effort to stabilize Bosnia and end the conflict was viewed differently among the American 
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people. Those that wanted the U.S. to intervene to put an end to the conflicts felt that U.S. 
involvement, whether multilateral or unilateral, was the best course of action.  
 On November 21st, 1995 after three weeks of negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, the leaders of 
Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia formulated a peace agreement which was signed in Paris a month 
later. The Pentagon and the U.S. State Department “secured troop contributions from over thirty 
NATO and non-NATO countries” (Recchia, 2015, 138). However, while Western Europe was 
prepared to increase its own contributions, it was not prepared to do so without the help of the 
United States. The U.S. Defense Department conceded that immediate U.S. “withdrawal might 
have derailed the entire peace process, the U.S. joint chiefs reluctantly agreed to an extension of 
the U.S. deployment, and cooperated in securing congressional funding for the NATO-led 
Stabilization Force (SFOR). Overall, the U.S. contributed 8,500 troops to SFOR1. The U.S. 
presence slightly decreased in Bosnia until 2004, when a “6,000 strong European Union 
peacekeeping force (EUFOR) took over from NATO” in the European Union’s attempt to show 














                                                     
1The United States contributed roughly one-third of the total NATO force of roughly 27,000. 
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Results 
Figure 1: US/UN Responsibility  
 
 
 American public opinion impacted many components of the decisions taken by President 
Clinton in the war. In terms of whose responsibility it was to intervene in Bosnia in an attempt to 
put an end of the conflict, at the emergence of the conflict a majority of the American public 
viewed military action as a European responsibility. However, the American public’s view on 
U.S. responsibility in Bosnia increased from the late months of 1993 and continued into the 
spring of 1994. In particular, public perception on U.S. responsibility changed after three 
significant events: it increased significantly after the Markale Massacre (February 1994), the 
Gorazhde enclave bombing (April 1994), and finally during the Dayton Peace Accord 
negotiations (December 1995). Ultimately, a plurality of Americans felt that American 
responsibility in the former Yugoslavia and more specifically in Bosnia was founded on the 
moral responsibility to stop ethnic cleansing, if Europe itself could not put an end to the conflict 
themselves. Each of these events were followed my critical and vocal action from President 
Clinton and his administration regarding the multilateral engagement of the U.S. and its allies to 
deter the aggression of the Bosnian Serbs. After these violent instances previously mentioned as 
well as the successful peace negotiations the American public shifted their views of 
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Figure 4: Favor/Oppose Air Strikes 
 
The level of public support regarding U.S. military action wavered in the first months of 
the conflict. When asked whether the U.S. should take military action against the Bosnian Serbs 
(Figure 3), support was generally low and increased as President Clinton’s rhetoric became more 
critical on the events persisting in Bosnia in April. Overall, the support for the U.S. to act 
unilaterally in Bosnia was low; and the American public were only offering their support of 
military action if the U.S. acted multilaterally with its European allies.  
In terms of early support of intervention in Bosnia (Figure 3), the American public 
generally were in support of enforcing the no-fly zone against Serbian aircrafts flying over 
Bosnia that was enacted by the United Nations in late 1992 and subsequently implemented in 
April of 1993. Public support in favor of the no-fly zone increased incrementally from the time it 
was first introduced until the policy was put in place accordingly. The level of public support for 
the implementation of the no-fly zone against Serb planes that entered restricted airspace 
generally increased between January and April 1993. 
 The levels of support for NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs aggression (Figure 
4) was relatively high in the summer of 1993, but slightly decreased over time. During this 
period, President Clinton threatened air strikes and publicly supported NATO airstrikes as a 
result of Bosnian Serbs attacking UN Peacekeepers in Sarajevo. As the conflict continued with 
the NATO ultimatum on air strikes in February 1994, the breakthrough with the Serbian pullback 
contributed to higher support among Americans for multilateral militarized action in Bosnia. The 
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September of 1993 with a majority of the public being in favor of carrying out airstrike attacks 
against the Bosnian Serbs if either UN troops or Bosnian safe havens were targeted.  
 
 
Figure 5: Presidential Handling 
 
 
Given the prevalence of media usage and the CNN effect in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
during the war, the American public’s attitudes on how the U.S. President was handling the 
situation either unilaterally or through NATO had a role in the decision to engage in military and 
humanitarian intervention. At the end of the Bush presidency in 1992, polls showed a majority or 
evenly split approval of the president’s handling of Bosnia. However, the public tended to be 
more disapproving during periods of inaction by the United States while in Bosnia. This can be 
seen throughout the polling data during the summer of 1994. American public opinion shifted 
where more Americans approved of President Clinton’s handling when he had a strong stance on 
certain events or participated in multilateral action in Bosnia. Public approval increased (and 
conversely disapproval dropped significantly) when President Clinton first mentioned 
intervening in Bosnia in June of 1993. In February of 1994, after the Markale Massacre and 
subsequent statement by President Clinton issuing an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs, approval 
ratings increased considerably. There was another spike in approval in presidential handling in 
June of 1994, and although there was no significant action in this month, this spike was a result 
of the foreign policy shift of the Clinton administration after a previous spike in opposing 
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seen in December of 1994, when the Bosnian Serb ceasefire agreement with the Bosnian 
Muslims was decided after open peace negotiations held by former President Carter. This cease-
fire lasted for roughly four months and prompted hope of further peacemaking negotiations, 
which allowed the American public to internalize the actions that were being taken to promote 
peace and stability in the region. Ultimately, the presidential approval ratings increased in 
January of 1996 after the U.S. agreed to contribute 8,500 troops to SFOR, showing a 
commitment to maintaining stability in the region post-Dayton.  
 
Conclusion 
After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the United States and European allies conducted 
humanitarian and military operations that served as a turning point in the ethnic conflicts that 
took place in the mid 1990s. The decision of the Clinton administration initiate involvement in 
the war in Bosnia posed many questions on the domestic front regarding why the U.S. would 
choose to intervene in a region where there was not a clearly defined path to victory. The United 
States and other Western allies intervened in the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina to facilitate 
stabilization in the region and put an end to violent aggression by the Bosnian Serbs against the 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Although the United States did not immediately get involved in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, their eventual engagement held a deep impact on the region and the 
legacy of the Western Balkans.  
The phases of the U.S. involvement in Bosnia spanned over two presidencies with the 
initial reluctance to interfere in the Western Balkans due to the fact that the U.S. public viewed 
the conflicts as a primarily European problem. This resulted in low public support for 
intervention in the first months of the war in Bosnia. The primary factor that deterred the 
American public from support for intervention was the ambiguity of unilateral vs. multilateral 
action given the other international crises that the U.S. was involved in during the early 1990s. 
Both the Bush and Clinton presidencies attempted to achieve their goals through diplomacy but 
as the conflict escalated so did the necessity of multilateral military intervention. The 
motivations for U.S. involvement is characterized in a linear fashion that begins with the CNN 
effect. The CNN effect and the prevalence of media in regard to the Bosnian war was a direct 
factor that influenced the levels of public opinion regarding the conflict itself and the handling of 
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the situation by President Clinton. The levels of public opinion in favor or against the actions 
taken by the United States resulted from the visbility of the war through the media. As events 
were bigger and more publicized like a statement given by President Clinton or a high ranking 
member of his cabinet that also played into public view on responsibility and presidential 
approval. The moral indignation of the Clinton administration also played a role in the rationale 
for engagement, as the violent and abhorrent events unfolded in Bosnia, President Clinton 
exhibited signs of strength by giving public statements on aggressions by the Bosnian Serbs 
which positively affected his approval ratings. 
 Ultimately, as public opinion shifted, the actions and stance of President Clinton 
changed to offset the negative public perception of his foreign policy initiatives in Bosnia. 
President Clinton and his cabinet were somewhat obsessed with polling data throughout the 
entirety of the Bosnian war because the conflict occurred during a period where polling mattered 
significantly leading up to the 1996 presidential election. As Commander in Chief, President 
Clinton’s desire to be reelected was a critical factor in how the actions of the United States 
unfolded. Therefore, intervention during the war in Bosnia was characterized by the moral 
perceptions of the American public which motivated the actions of President Clinton to 
peacefully end the conflict for moral reasons (to end the violence and practice of ethnic 
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